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ABSTRACT: 
 The aim of this study is to determine the causal relationship between environmental 
taxes and economic growth, using different measures of environmental taxes with 
GDP as well as adjusted net savings. A panel of European countries and a separate 
panel of OECD countries are used from 1995 to 2006 and the standard Granger non-
causality approach is applied. The results suggest some evidence of long-run causality 
running from economic growth to increased revenue from the environmental taxes, 
with also some evidence of short-run causality in the reverse direction. The inclusion 
of population and a proxy for economic subsidies had little effect on the long-run 
relationship, although the proxy for subsidies did have some short-run effect on 
growth.  
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I. Introduction 
Over the recent past, the European Union (EU) member states in particular and other 
countries in general have been set voluntary targets for the reduction in pollution and 
emission of greenhouse gases, which have facilitated the sometimes controversial use 
of environmental taxes across the world, especially in the EU. As a result of recent 
concerns relating to the harmful effects of global warming, policy makers have 
become increasingly interested in the use of environmental taxation as a means of 
combating the problem, in order to meet targets set at the 1997 Kyoto protocol to 
reduce greenhouse gases. 
 
Also, during the 1990s, beginning with the Scandinavian countries, there has been a 
number of attempts to introduce Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) in EU member 
states. This has involved shifting the burden of taxation away from factors of 
production to pollution and the users of natural resources, summarised as a move from 
economic ‘goods’ to environmental ‘bads’. Again, one of the main ways in which EU 
governments have attempted to do this is through the use of energy taxes, in order to 
encourage a reduction in carbon emissions.  
 
The aim of this paper is to determine the direction of causality in the long and short 
run between economic growth and environmentally orientated taxes using two 
separate datasets for the EU and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. The novel element to this paper is the use of 
Granger causality tests to test for the causal relationship between environmental taxes 
and various measures of economic growth, within the context of a panel dataset, 
which the authors believe to be the first time this has been attempted. This could 
potentially be important as it has been hoped that increases in environmental taxes 
would not only improve the environment but also increase economic growth, at a time 
when economies are struggling to grow. For the OECD dataset, this allows us to not 
only include the US in the study, but also use the adjusted net saving (ANS) measure 
of economic performance, which includes a measure of the environment, instead of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Other factors are also considered as determinants of 
both growth and taxes, such as population and environmental subsidies. This paper 
attempts to contribute to the debate on the effects of environmental taxes on the 
economy, by using the EU and OECD panel data sets to determine, using standard 
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panel Granger non-causality tests, if there is any causal link between environmental 
taxes and economic growth1.   
 
Following the introduction, the methodology used in this study is outlined and the 
form that ETR has taken in the EU member states discussed. The data and results are 
then examined and finally we suggest some conclusions and policy implications of the 
study. 
 
1.1 Previous literature of taxation and economic growth  
 Granger causality tests have been extensively used to determine the direction in 
which causal relations lie between a set of variables. However as far as we know, they 
have not been used on economic growth and environmental taxes.  As Granger (1988) 
suggests that if there is cointegration between a set of I(1) variables, then there must 
be causation in one direction at least. This is because the presence of cointegration 
implies an error correction model can be formed, in which the error correction term 
has a significant effect on the dependent variable. However the causality approach has 
been used to determine causal relations between energy consumption, energy prices 
and economic growth (Constantini and Martini, 2010).2 
 
To date most of the taxes particularly environmental ones and the growth literature 
has been theory based, either using environmental taxes in an endogenous growth 
framework as in Bovenberg and De Mooij (1997) or as a general measure of 
environmental policy as in Ricci (2007). The empirical literature on this issue has 
mainly concentrated on the use of simulation exercises rather than the use of 
econometric modelling, due to the lack of suitable macro-data so far. There have also 
been parallel studies which have empirically assessed the effects of personal and 
                                               
1 This study uses GDP and adjusted net saving to represent economic growth. An alternative approach 
used in many simulation studies is to use unemployment, which is usually highly correlated with GDP. 
This study has not used unemployment data as in some countries such as the UK there is a strong 
argument that it underestimates the true value, as many who are long-term unemployed are on 
alternative benefits instead, so do not appear on unemployment lists. 
2 The definition of Granger causality is that if variable X Granger causes variable Y, then past values of 
X contain information that can be helpful in predicting Y above  the information contained in past 
values of Y alone. 
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corporate taxes on economic growth, such as Lee and Gordon (2005). However these 
studies have not used causality tests to determine the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth. They have tended to be panel regressions and in general they find 
that increasing taxes reduces economic growth. A further study by Kneller et 
al.(1999) also shows that in general taxes reduce economic growth although they 
suggest only distortionary taxes reduce growth, these would include corporate and 
income taxes. 
 
The approach to environmental taxation in the EU has concentrated on the use of 
taxes to improve the environment, whilst using the revenue raised to reduce the 
distortionary taxation on labour and production. This policy is often regarded as 
producing a double effect whereby the environment is improved and at the same time 
the economy benefits through the reduction in these distortionary taxes (Bosquet 
(2000)). However other studies (Myles, 2000) argue that for it to occur, the tax system 
must be inefficient, in which case a better policy would be to improve the system, 
rather than tax the pollutants. Nevertheless, Fisher and Van Marrewijk (1998) 
illustrated a theoretical model which suggests that pollution taxes can result in 
economic improvement.  
 
Other studies have suggested further justifications for a positive causal effect from 
environmental policies to economic growth. Ricci (2007) suggests a number of ways 
in which measures to improve the environment can enhance economic growth, such 
as the prospect of a better environment may encourage saving. Pautrel (2009) 
suggests when the reduced effects of pollution on health are taken into account, the 
effects of the environmental policy can be positive on the economy. Causality could 
also run in the opposite direction from GDP to taxes, as a rise in the income and 
wealth of a country increases the ability and inclination of a country to pay for higher 
environmental taxes. 
 
The main empirical work on environmental taxation and economic growth has centred 
around the use of simulations on the impact of ETR on the environment, use of 
natural resources and the wider economy, although Leiter et al. (2009) have also used 
the same EU environmental tax data  as a determinant of investment. In their study 
they find that environmental tax revenue, as an example of an environmental 
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regulation, has a positive but diminishing effect on investment. Also, studies like 
Patuelli et al. (2005) and Anger et al. (2010) focussed on a meta-analytical approach 
in analyzing the effects of environmental taxes on the economy, which involves the 
use of regression techniques to determine the effects from simulation studies. As far 
as we know there have been no econometric studies in general or Granger non-
causality studies in particular on the relationship between environmental taxes and 
economic growth   
 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Environmental Tax Data 
The measure of environmental tax revenue is based on the internationally recognised 
definition used by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) and 
accepted by the main international bodies, such as the OECD. An environmental tax 
is defined as any tax, which has a physical unit as a base and for which there is 
evidence that it has a specific effect on the environment3. In this study the EU data is 
environmental tax revenue as a proportion of GDP and of total tax revenue, which is 
used as a proxy for the tax rate. 
 
The data used in this study is annual, with 12 years and runs from 1995 to 2006, 
starting in 1995 as this is the earliest data available for the environmental tax 
measures. Specifically, the environmental tax revenue data is predominantly 
comprised of taxes on transport and energy products, such as the duty charged on 
hydrocarbons in the transport sector, as well as the industrial sector. It also includes 
the fossil fuel levy, which is a tax on electricity generated using fossil fuels. A 
recently introduced tax is the climate change levy, including petroleum, gasoline, coal 
and electricity. Further related tax sources include vehicle excise duty, the value 
added tax (VAT) applied to petroleum and the air passenger duty, which applies to air 
travel within the European Economic Area (EEA), but at a lower rate with countries 
                                               
3 As recognised in other studies, there is some debate over what counts as a tax, in particular the use of 
earmarked sources of revenue. For the benefit of this study we rely on the definitions used by Eurostat, 
which is common across all the countries in the study. As noted earlier this is a macro based study 
using aggregated data for both taxes, pollution and energy consumption, data on a more disaggregated 
level is not currently available. 
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outside the EEA. The transport taxes relate to the ownership and use of motor 
vehicles, which makes it comparable to the OECD data. However taxes on aeroplane 
flights are also included. The taxes refer to both recurrent and one-off taxes, such as 
road tax and sales of equipment respectively. 
 
In European areas, the transport and energy taxes initially served as an energy security 
measure however in recent years the trend has shifted towards an environmental one 
(Davoust, 2008). There are about 375 environmentally related taxes in the OECD and 
about 90% of the revenues received from these taxes relate to motor vehicle fuels and 
motor vehicles (OECD, 2006). Among the EU 27 member states, the energy tax 
represents 75% of the environmental taxes of which 80% of this tax are from fuel 
taxes found in the transport sector (Eurostat, 2009). There is large variation in the fuel 
tax burden among the EU member states, in particular with regard to the proportion of 
transport taxes. In the transportation sector, two commonly used fuels are diesel and 
gasoline. The former is predominantly used in commercial vehicles such as freight 
transport whereas the latter which is unleaded and consumed in private vehicles. The 
estimated CO2 emission in gasoline is at 22.2 pounds/gallon compared to diesel at 19.4 
pounds/gallon (US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2005).  
 
On the one hand, an increase in transportation taxes impacts on households and firms 
which in effect changes the mode of transport i.e. from private to public transport. On 
the other hand, this type of tax is primarily for revenue generation where the revenue 
obtained from this transport related tax is said to be recycled back to the 
transportation sector for the construction and maintenance of roads. Indeed, about 2-
2.5% of GDP is revenue raised from environmentally related fees and charges. For 
this study the transport taxes i.e. the fuel taxes from diesel and unleaded gasoline for 
commercial use were obtained from the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 
percentages for the years 1995-2006 (IEA, 2008) and were converted into US$ per 
litre.  
 
2.2. Adjusted Savings Data 
This study also incorporates adjusted net savings (ANS) also referred to as genuine 
savings which measures the economic growth in a sustainable manner. The difference 
between GDP and ANS is that the former measures the physical capital whereas the 
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latter incorporates the monetary values of physical, human, natural and social capital 
as well as the stock of knowledge. The dataset is found at the World Bank in the 
World Development Indicators (WDI), which contains all country-level and regional 
data as estimated by the World Bank (2008).  
 
There was a strong need among academics, researchers and international institutions 
in particular the World Bank, to establish an indicator that accounts for sustainability 
in economic development as GDP per capita was an insufficient criterion. The World 
Bank calculates ANS as: total net national saving and education expenditure minus 
the resource rents (depletion of energy, minerals and forest) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
damage. Since the ANS index was established numerous discussions have emerged 
about its properties.  Studies such as Hamilton and Clemens (1999) suggest that 
‘genuine saving’ is a useful indicator of sustainability however others like Pillarisetti 
(2005) argue that environmental sustainability needs to be examined in a global 
context and that natural capital should be treated independently of physical and 
human capital.  In one recent empirical study by Gnègnè (2009) where he examined 
ANS and welfare changes, he points out that the World Bank ANS is a step forward 
in understanding sustainability though more effort is required to improve it.  
 
2.3. Methodology 
Although the specific techniques differ, the general approach to Granger non-
causality tests, either using time series or panel data, involve the application of 
cointegration techniques with the subsequent error correction model (ECM) used to 
test for short and long-run causality (Granger et al. 2000)4. As noted by Al Sadoon 
(2009), the concept of Granger non-causality also incorporates a number of related 
concepts such as cointegration, stability and controllability. When following this 
approach, the first step involves testing for a panel unit root and in this study the 
popular Im Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test is used. If the variables are found to be I(1), 
we then need to test for cointegration, in this case using the Kao (1999) test. This test 
is initially used, as although it can only be used in a bi-variate context, Gutierrez 
                                               
4There are many examples of panel causality tests which include varying approaches such as Apergis  
(2004) who uses the cointegration ECM approach, Constantini and Martini, (2010) who use a similar 
approach to the one adopted here but in a multivariate context. In addition Menegaki (2010) use a 
random effects approach and causality tests in a similar study but using renewable energy. 
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(2003) suggests in a homogenous panel it has higher power than other competing tests 
when, as in this study, the time series component is relatively short. Given the 
following model: 
 
ititit ey   10      (1) 
 
Where ity is GDP (in logarithms), 10 ,  are parameters to be estimated and ite is the 
environmental tax (if testing for causality running the opposite direction, ite would be 
the dependent variable). The Kao test (1999) is then used to test for cointegration and 
is based on a panel version of the ADF test on the residual ( it ): 
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 This can be used to produce the following ADF statistic as shown in equation (3), 
which is a one tailed test and where 2ˆv is the estimated variance and 
2
0ˆ v is the 
estimated long-run variance of the error term and follows the standard normal 
distribution. ADF is the ADF statistic for equation (2): 
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The long-run relationship and consequent error correction term is then based on a 
dynamic OLS or DOLS model. DOLS involves estimating the long run bi-variate 
relationship with the inclusion of a lead and lag of the differenced explanatory 
variable and has better properties than other competing techniques. Then as noted by 
Granger et al. (2000), the long-run causality can be measured by the significance of 
the error correction term, whilst the short-run causality can be measured by the joint 
significance of the lagged explanatory variables. This gives the following 
specification: 
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 Where itdy is the differenced real per capita GDP and is equivalent to economic 
growth, itde is the differenced environmental tax. The tax data is with respect to both 
GDP and total taxes, the use of the latter measure ensures that the results are not due 
to having GDP on both sides of the equation. TD are time dummy variables taking the 
value of 1 for a particular year and zero otherwise. The use of the Arellano-Bover 
approach allows the inclusion of fixed effects into the model, to remove the problem 
of unobserved heterogeneity, where any effects not captured by the explanatory 
variables are controlled for. The use of orthogonal deviations, which is similar to 
differences from the mean approach, removes the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
cross section, the time dummy variables then control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
the time series. The it is the error term from the DOLS estimate and represents the 
error correction term, which is assumed to be negative. As with Granger et al. (2000), 
long-run causality is measured by the standard t-statistic, whilst the lagged 
explanatory variables measure short-run causality, in this case using a t-test as only a 
single lag is included, due to the data being annual. Bond (2002) suggests the 
Arellano-Bover approach may have some advantages over other approaches to 
dynamic panel models. 
 
In addition we expect the error correction term to be negative to ensure the model is 
stable and the coefficient represents the speed of adjustment following an exogenous 
shock. To test the overidentifying restrictions imposed by the use of GMM, we use 
the Sargan test. In addition we use time dummy variables to model the time series 
fixed effects, as in part this controls for the business cycle and also it models the rapid 
changes in environmental regulations in the EU recently. A test of joint significance 
of these dummy variables shows they are highly significant. 
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 The final sets of tests are conducted on a multivariate model in which the population 
and a proxy for environmental subsidies are included. As this is a multivariate model 
the Kao approach to cointegration is as explained earlier not applicable, instead the 
Pedroni approach has been applied specifically to determine whether the addition of 
other factors to the bi-variate model affect the result. The Pedroni approach (1999) 
suggests seven tests for cointegration which include the panel v-statistic, panel rho 
statistic, panel ADF-statistic, panel PP-statistic, group rho-statistic, group ADF-
statistic and group PP-statistic. As before in the event of no consistent evidence of 
cointegration, the standard Granger causality models are estimated without an error 
correction model5. 
 
3.  Results and Discussion 
The EU panel consists of twenty five countries all from the European Union6.  All the 
EU data is taken from Eurostat at the European Communities, consisting of 
environmental taxes as a percentage of GDP as well as total tax revenue. In addition 
we have used transport taxes again as a percentage of GDP and total taxes, to 
compliment the OECD database of diesel and gasoline taxes (IEA, 2008). The GDP is 
real per capita. Other explanatory variables include population and a proxy for 
environmental subsidies namely for the EU data this is renewable energy data which 
is the percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources. This is used 
because there is not sufficient data on environmental subsidies. The OECD dataset 
consists of all OECD countries where there was sufficient data (See Table 2), the 
diesel and gasoline taxes are also taken from the OECD where the taxes are defined as 
the level of tax in dollars per litre of gasoline/diesel (See Table 3). The adjusted net 
savings data is as explained earlier taken from the World Bank (World Bank, 2008). 
 
                                               
5 When there is no cointegration, the error correction terms are not included in the ECMS as they are 
I(1) in the event of no cointegration and all variables in the ECM need to be I(0). In general when 
added  they were not significant. 
6 The countries used are listed in Tables 2 and 3. They are limited by the data availability for some 
countries, particularly the time series element where we have just 12 years of data. However the data 
includes transition economies too, who were required to improve their environments as a condition for 
joining the EU during the 1990s and 2000s. European data is used as it is compatible across all the 
countries chosen and the variables used are defined in a similar way across these countries. 
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 Table 2 includes the summary statistics for both transport and total environmental 
taxes relative to GDP and total tax revenue, both follow a similar pattern overall. As 
is evident the countries that use environmental taxes the most tend to be Scandinavian. 
Denmark relies on these taxes more than any other country, with about 5% of GDP 
and 10% of total tax revenue being collected in the form of environmental taxes. 
Transport taxes tend to make up about 1% of GDP and 2% of total tax revenue, with a 
relatively low variance across the EU. In general some of the Eastern European 
countries collect the lowest proportions, with the Baltic states being the lowest. The 
same pattern is followed with the OECD dataset as shown in Table 3, in that the UK, 
Switzerland and Norway have the highest average taxes on its fuel, with the USA not 
surprisingly having the lowest. 
 
 The results for the IPS panel unit root tests are presented in Table 4 and show that 
overall all the variables contain a unit root, suggesting the need to difference these 
variables before testing for non-causality7. The cointegration tests are contained in 
Table 5 for the EU dataset and Table 6 for the OECD dataset, as with Granger et al. 
(2000) we test for cointegration in both directions, with both variables acting as the 
dependent variable. The Kao test for cointegration results on the EU dataset show 
evidence of a stable long-run cointegrating relationship only when taxes are the 
dependent variable and taxes are as a proportion of GDP. However, when GDP is the 
dependent variable there is no evidence of a long-run relationship. Nevertheless with 
the OECD dataset, there is evidence of a stable long-run relationship between 
environmental taxes and GDP, but only when the tax variable is the dependent 
variable and gasoline taxes are used.  
 
Based on these results we conclude that although there is some evidence of a stable 
long-run relationship when the taxes are the dependent variable, there is no evidence 
for it when GDP/ANS are the dependent variables. Where there is evidence of 
cointegration, the error correction term will be included in the non-causality tests, but 
excluded where there is no evidence as in Granger et al. (2000). 
                                               
7 Although population appears to be I(2) with the IPS test, other panel unit root tests such as the 
Phillips-Perron Fisher test indicate it is I(1), the difference in the latter test is that Newey-West adjusted 
standard errors are used to overcome autocorrelation instead of adding lags of the dependent variable.. 
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Table 7 contains the results from the Pedroni (2004) test for cointegration8 with the 
multivariate model including renewable energy and population. The results are mixed 
with different results giving varying conclusions, but in general the null of no 
cointegration is not rejected in the majority of cases. This suggests that the error 
correction term should not be included in the models in which the Granger non-
causality is conducted. 
 
Tables 8 contains the results from the GMM estimation of the ECMs using the 
Arellano-Bovver approach and the results indicate little evidence of any short-run 
causal effect running from the environmental taxes or transport taxes9 to economic 
growth, as evidenced by the lack of significance of the lagged explanatory variable. 
The exception is environmental taxes relative to total taxes which significantly affects 
output. This offers tentative support for other studies which find either little or 
ambiguous evidence of the environmental taxes affecting economic growth, as noted 
in Bosquet (2000) and Anger et al, (2010). However there is evidence of short-run 
causality from GDP to environmental taxes with respect to GDP and transport taxes 
relative to total taxes, but it is negatively signed, which may be due to overall tax 
revenue rising during times of economic growth, so requiring less need for the 
environmental taxes.  
 
In Table 10 using the OECD dataset, the significant error correction term backs up the 
evidence of long-run causality running from GDP to gasoline taxes, suggesting as 
countries become richer, they are more inclined to use environmental taxes. The 
Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions indicates the null is not rejected in all 
cases, suggesting the instruments used in the GMM estimation are acceptable. In 
                                               
8 Although the dataset does not lend itself to the use of the Pedroni approach as mentioned earlier, we 
have followed Narayan and Smyth (2008) whom include the results from the Pedroni test, despite it not 
suiting their methodology.  As with their approach the failure to find cointegration in this study could 
be due to the lack of a long-run relationship between the variables or due to the short period in this 
dataset. 
9 Energy and pollution tax data was also available, but produced similar results to transport taxes so are 
not included. Results available from the authors on request. 
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addition the F-test on the joint significance of the time dummies, suggests all are 
jointly significant so need to be included in the causality tests. 
 
 The models in which the population (po) and renewable energy (re) measures are also 
included in Table 9 and tend to offer less support for the previous bi-variate results as 
many of the previously significant lags are no longer significant with regard to the 
taxes and GDP growth. However there is evidence of Granger causality from 
renewable energy, proxying environmental subsidies to economic growth, although it 
is negatively signed, suggesting expenditure on environmental protection as yet has 
not produced the technological spillovers and subsequent increase in growth. In 
addition in the case of transport taxes, changes in population Granger cause the 
transport tax, suggesting countries with higher population growth have lower levels of 
transport taxes, which is not as expected although this could simply reflect the fact 
that high levels of population growth have been associated with lower economic 
growth, which indirectly would reduce the tax revenue. 
  
 Using the OECD dataset10, the results are presented in Table 10 and the significant 
error correction terms suggests there is long-run causality running from GDP to the 
gasoline and diesel taxes, which again backs up the cointegration tests. There is also a 
positive short-run effect from GDP to diesel taxes, which may suggest as the economy 
grows, the use of freight increases, which increases the tax taken from diesel. The 
adjusted net savings data suggests much the same as GDP, although there is evidence 
of short run causal effects from the gasoline taxes to the net savings, which is negative. 
This suggests that in the short term greater use of gasoline taxes may harm aspects of 
the economy. 
 
                                               
10 With the OECD dataset, we also attempted to use population and a variable proxying environmental 
subsidies, which in this case was the research and development expenditure on the environment. 
However using the Pedroni approach to panel cointegration, there was no evidence of cointegration in 
any test and also in the Granger causality tests, there was no evidence of any causality, so the results 
have not been reported. We also tried using the gasoline and diesel taxes as a percentage of the cost of 
a litre of fuel, but these measures did not work as well as the total cost of the tax, possibly because the 
cost of a gallon of fuel differs substantially across the countries tested. The base used is the same for all 
countries. 
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The error correction terms are negative when causality runs to the environmental 
taxes indicating stability although the speed of adjustment depends on the measure 
used, being between 20 and 50% of adjustment back to the long-run in a year. These 
results accord with other studies that suggest results are sensitive to the measurement 
of the environmental variables (See Jeppesen et al, 2002), although diesel and 
gasoline taxes tend to be more significant than the general environmental tax 
measures used by the EU.  
 
4. Conclusions 
These results provide some evidence of a long-run causal effect from GDP and net 
adjusted savings to environmental and/or transport taxes, however there is little 
evidence of long-run causality in the other direction with the EU or OECD 
environmental and transport taxes data. This result does not change substantially 
when other factors are considered, such as population and proxies for environmental 
subsidies. This suggests there is little evidence that an expansion of environmentally 
friendly tax policies will enhance economic growth. The policy interpretation is that 
more smart approaches for efficient instruments to promote sustainable economic 
growth and at the same time managing the natural resources and controlling pollution 
levels efficiently is required. Hence, the link between environmentally related taxes 
and environmental development in association with revenue recycling is important. 
For instance, in some OECD countries, the motor fuel and motor vehicles taxes are 
spent on the construction or maintenance of roads and other activities such as: 
installation of noise-protection walls, development of bicycle lanes and improvement 
in public transport (OECD, 2006). Hence, future research can assess the magnitude of 
such revenue recycling in environmental development against the levels of the tax 
burden for countries.  
 
Also, with the OECD data, both diesel and gasoline taxes have no long-run causal 
effect on output. There is also no causal relationship from gasoline or diesel taxes to 
adjusted net savings, suggesting that our failure to find support for the positive effects 
of environmental taxes on growth is not due to limitations with GDP as a measure of 
welfare. Unfortunately, there is no data on the use of biofuels over this time period, 
which is an important area for future research as more data becomes available. 
Overall the evidence suggests richer countries are more able to afford the costs 
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associated with the environmental taxes, although as with other results the effect is 
sensitive to the measure of the environmental policy used. 
 
The policy implications of this study suggest that for country’s to meet their pollution 
targets, environmental taxes and the associated increase in renewable energy will 
probably need to continue but it is imperative to link these actions to economic 
development. The evidence here suggests that increasing environmental taxes does 
not appear to have any substantial impact on the economy. Also, it does not indicate 
any harmful impact from the increase of taxes, which is important for the transition 
economies to improve their environmental standards.  
 
 Moreover, future research will need to concentrate on other larger economies, 
specifically that of the USA and China and over longer time periods as the data 
becomes available for the exploration of the underlying effects of changes in 
environmental taxes to environmental externalities. Also of importance is the addition 
of more disaggregated data and other explanatory variables, as the data becomes 
available, in particular the effects of environmentally related technology, which could 
include specific data on patents. In addition the relationship between environmental 
taxes and other personal and corporate taxes could be included as further factors 
effecting growth. The study attempts to control for the endogeneity problem using 
GMM estimation techniques, however it would be interesting to use alternative sets of 
instruments to the ones used in this study, again as suitable data becomes available.  
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Y 
Taxt 
Taxy 
Trantaxt 
Trantaxy 
ANS 
DTax 
Gtax 
Populat 
RE 
real GDP per capita 
Total environment taxes to total taxes(%) 
Total environment taxes to GDP(%) 
Transport taxes to total taxes(%) 
Transport taxes to GDP(%) 
Adjusted net saving 
Diesel tax 
Gas Tax 
Population 
Renewable energy (% of energy from renewable sources) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics regarding tax revenue for EU (%) 
 Total environmental taxes Transport Taxes 
 % of GDP % of total tax % of GDP % of total tax 
Country mean var mean var mean Var mean Var 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech  
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
2.44 
2.34 
2.57 
3.02 
5.23 
1.77 
3.13 
2.56 
2.38 
2.53 
2.99 
2.69 
3.16 
2.29 
1.80 
2.87 
3.48 
3.82 
2.21 
3.19 
2.12 
2.85 
2.83 
0.05 
0.01 
0.02 
0.26 
0.17 
0.20 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
0.19 
0.06 
0.10 
0.09 
0.22 
0.12 
0.01 
0.10 
0.02 
0.12 
0.06 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
5.66 
5.20 
7.30 
9.92 
10.66 
5.50 
6.93 
5.85 
5.93 
8.01 
7.72 
8.61 
7.59 
7.59 
6.12 
7.51 
11.94 
9.79 
6.55 
9.41 
6.22 
5.72 
7.82 
0.25 
0.06 
0.07 
1.02 
0.64 
2.72 
0.12 
0.20 
0.27 
2.69 
0.30 
0.52 
0.50 
2.74 
1.38 
0.14 
3.55 
0.17 
1.68 
0.97 
0.31 
0.05 
0.51 
0.79 
0.66 
0.29 
1.93 
2.04 
0.17 
1.06 
0.61 
0.37 
0.82 
0.37 
1.25 
0.45 
0.22 
0.66 
0.13 
2.13 
1.34 
0.22 
1.00 
0.41 
0.33 
0.54 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.06 
0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.82 
1.47 
0.83 
6.51 
4.14 
0.53 
2.35 
1.40 
0.92 
2.57 
0.97 
3.99 
1.09 
0.74 
2.26 
0.33 
7.36 
3.43 
0.64 
2.94 
1.21 
0.66 
1.51 
0.04 
0.01 
0.05 
2.11 
0.13 
0.06 
0.10 
0.02 
0.00 
0.09 
0.13 
0.06 
0.03 
0.28 
0.47 
0.00 
2.23 
0.02 
0.04 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
Notes: Var is the variance. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for OECD (in US$ per litre) 
 Diesel taxes Gas taxes 
Country mean variance mean variance 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovak 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
USA 
0.36 
0.37 
0.31 
0.36 
0.45 
0.46 
0.31 
0.40 
0.41 
0.48 
0.42 
0.53 
0.25 
0.41 
0.40 
0.35 
0.39 
0.57 
0.75 
0.13 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0.02 
0.01 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0.01 
0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0.69 
0.82 
0.54 
0.85 
0.89 
0.83 
0.57 
0.80 
0.68 
0.86 
0.94 
0.95 
0.50 
0.74 
0.57 
0.62 
0.81 
0.61 
0.89 
0.12 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.05 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0 
Notes: These values represent the amount of tax in a litre of fuel in US dollars. 
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Table 4. IPS Unit root tests 
                EU OECD  
Variable   Level    Differenced             level            differenced 
Y 4.126 -2.663**  Y 2.414 -2.271** 
taxt 0.785 -5.993** Ans 3.614 -2.866** 
taxy 0.278 -5.879** Dtax 0.775 -2.246** 
trantaxt -0.212 -8.383** Gtax 1.395 -1.657** 
Trantaxy 
 
Re 
 
populat 
-0.171 
 
1.955 
 
8.540 
-8.131** 
 
-7.794** 
 
5.339 
(69.036**) 
 
 
  
 
 
      
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 5% level (one tailed test). Lag length 
 determined by modified Akaike Information Criteria. Value in parentheses  
is Fisher chi-sq Philips-Perron test statistic. 
 
Table 5. Tests for Cointegration in EU Dataset 
Test Statistic tax→y y→tax 
Y/taxy 
Y/taxt 
Y/trantaxt 
Ytrantaxy 
1.732 
1.846 
2.136 
1.833 
-2.973** 
-1.374 
0.661 
-1.096 
Notes:  ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 
the 5%  level. In the first and second columns, the dependent variable in 
the cointegrating relation is first followed by the explanatory variable. 
 
Table 6. Tests for Cointegration in OECD Dataset 
Test Statistic tax→y y→tax 
Y/Dtax 
Y/Gtax 
ANS/Dtax 
ANS/Gtax 
-0.694 
-0.143 
1.550 
1.524 
-1.535 
-6.180** 
2.896 
2.312 
Notes:  See Table 3.**  indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no  
Cointegration at 5%  level of significance 
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Table 7. Results of Pedroni Cointegration Tests including population and 
renewable energy 
Test Statistic Taxt Taxy Trantaxt Trantaxy 
Panel v-statistics 
Panel rho-statistics 
Panel PP-statistics 
Panel ADF-statistics 
Group rho-statistics 
Group PP-statistics 
Group ADF-statistics 
-0.437 
2.370 
-0.822 
-2.870** 
4.481 
-6.226** 
-6.173** 
-3.318 
-0.100 
-15.183** 
-11.079** 
3.461 
-11.424** 
-7.965** 
-0.727 
2.575 
-0.944 
-2.089** 
3.741 
-7.217** 
-6.723** 
-0.874 
2.707 
-0.075 
-2.612** 
3.644 
-5.546** 
-6.585** 
Notes: ** indicates rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 5% level of significance (one tailed 
test). Lag length determined by Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criteria 
 
 
 
Table 8. Granger Causality Tests with EU Data  
Causality 
direction 
ECT  
(t-statistic) 
Lag coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
F-test  
(time dummies) 
Sargan  
(p-value) 
TAXT→Y 
Y→TAXT 
Y→TAXY 
TAXY→Y 
TRTAXT→Y 
Y→TRTAXT 
TRTAXY→Y 
Y→TRTAXY 
 
 
-0.360(5.994)** 
 
 
-0.005( 3.848)** 
-0.443 (0.368) 
-0.938 (2.140)** 
-0.011 (3.531) 
-0.047 (0.039) 
-0.017 (4.524)** 
-1.174 (0.302) 
0.0003 (0.146) 
48.153** 
69.828** 
69.242** 
56.060** 
25.447** 
3.871** 
19.167** 
5.290** 
0.244 
0.298 
0.712 
0.318 
0.485 
0.290 
0.497 
0.178 
Notes: ECT is the error correction term. The instruments used in the GMM estimation were the second 
lag of the dependent variable and the yearly dummies. The fourth column is a F-test on the joint 
significance of the time dummies and the fifth column contains the p-value for the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions. ** indicates it is significantly different to 0 at the 5% level of significance. 
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Table 9. Granger causality with EU dataset and including population and 
renewable energy. 
 
Direction of 
Causality 
Taxt(-1)/ 
Y(-1) 
RE(-1) Populat (-1) F-test  
(time 
dummies) 
Sargan  
(p-value) 
TAXT→Y 
 
Y→TAXT 
 
Y→TAXY 
 
TAXY→Y 
 
TRTAXT→Y 
 
Y→TRTAXT 
 
TRTAXY→Y 
 
Y→TRTAXY 
-0.000 
(0.020) 
-0.931 
(0.539) 
0.552 
(0.877) 
-0.007 
(0.263) 
-0.005 
(0.230) 
-0.875 
(0.980) 
-0.032 
(0.426) 
-0.100 
(0.345) 
-0.004** 
(3.415) 
-0.006 
(1.055) 
0.003 
(0.619) 
-0.004** 
(2.838) 
-0.004** 
(3.790) 
-0.008 
(0.634) 
-0.004** 
(3.600) 
0.004 
(0.698) 
-1.450 
(0.683) 
-21.256 
(1.280) 
7.753 
(0.352) 
-1.602 
(0.664) 
-1.273 
(0.706) 
-59.048** 
(5.236) 
-1.415 
(0.761) 
-20.451** 
(4.001) 
44.433** 
 
12.832** 
 
25.896** 
 
44.433** 
 
35.300** 
 
3.461** 
 
37.648** 
 
3.247** 
0.233 
 
0.270 
 
0.147 
 
0.229 
 
0.206 
 
0.291 
 
0.209 
 
0.399 
Notes: See Table 6, RE is the differenced renewable energy and populat is the differenced population. 
**  indicates it is significantly different to 0 at the 5%  levels of significance. 
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Table 10. Granger Causality Tests with OECD Data 
Causality 
direction 
ECT 
(t-statistic) 
Short-run causality Sargan test 
(p-value) 
F-test  
(time dummies) 
DTAX→Y 
Y→DTAX 
GTAX→Y 
Y→GTAX 
DTAX→NS 
NS→DTAX 
GTAX→NS 
NS→GTAX 
 
 
 
-0.457 (4.951)** 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 (0.084) 
    -0.340 (0.233) 
0.029 (1.418) 
-0.069 (0.114) 
0.194 (0.981) 
-0.201 (0.501) 
-0.335 (2.497)** 
-0.008 (0.083) 
0.252 
0.331 
0.242 
0.473 
0.361 
0.420 
0.501 
0.126 
84.021** 
82.710** 
103.805** 
174.00** 
49.841** 
108.714** 
25.491** 
67.510** 
Notes:  The instruments used in the GMM estimation were the second lag of the dependent variable 
and the yearly dummies. The fourth column contains the p-value for the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions, the fifth column a F-test on joint significance of the time dummies. ** indicates it is 
significantly different to 0 at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
